American Politics: ANZUS at 60

By Tom Switzer

This week marks the 60th anniversary of the security alliance between Australia and the United States.

On September 1 1951, Percy Spender — Australia’s external affairs minister who had just become ambassador to Washington — New Zealand foreign minister Frederick Doidge, and Dean Acheson — President Harry Truman's secretary of state — signed the ANZUS Treaty.

Since that day in San Francisco, the alliance has been the centrepiece of Australia’s defence and foreign policy.

Canberra’s close relationship with what the Prime Minister at the time, Sir Robert Menzies, used to delight in calling “our great and powerful friend” has undoubtedly been in Australia’s national interest.

The advantages of the alliance have included favourable access to US technology and intelligence.

On most vital issues of the post-war era — containment of communism; stability and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific; and Pine Gap and US military bases — Australian interests have coincided with those of the US.

But several myths cloud the alliance. Here are three of them:

The first myth is that the ANZUS Treaty provides an unequivocal security guarantee.

Contrary to what prime ministers since Menzies have argued, the security commitment is not as iron clad as that which binds the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, which was signed two years earlier.

Read Article IV closely:

Each party recognises that an armed attack in the Pacific area on any of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.

Note how the article speaks vaguely of acting to meet the common danger; that is, after the observance of national constitutional requirements. In Washington’s case, this would presumably include discussions between the president and Congress. Anyone who has studied US political history knows that nothing is guaranteed in Beltway politics.

Immediately after the treaty terms had been settled, moreover, the US envoy John Foster Dulles insisted in unconditional language: “The US can discharge its obligations ... in any way and in any area that it sees fit.”

As my USSC colleague James Curran points out in his excellent overview of the alliance (see “Access anxiety” in the Australian Literary Review, out on September 7), it is not surprising that Australia’s leaders had been anxious about the scope of the treaty. “It sowed the seeds of doubt as to whether, in fact, the Americans would come to Australia’s aid at a time of trouble,” writes Curran.

A second myth about the alliance is that our shared history and values mean that we always stand united.

True, for much of the past 60 years, Washington (under Democratic and Republican leaderships) and Canberra (under Coalition and Labor leaderships) have had intimately close relations. But one should not overstate the case here.

Take the different responses to China’s Communist Revolution in 1949. The Truman administration and Congress pushed for an economic boycott of the mainland, and effectively isolated the regime until the 1970s. However, the newly elected Menzies government, backed by Ben Chifley’s Labor Opposition, supported trade — mainly in agriculture — with what quickly became known as “Red China.”

During this period, incidentally, Washington had recognised Formosa, or what is today known as Taiwan, as the legitimate government of China; Australia recognised neither Peking nor Taipei until 1966, when Harold Holt established a diplomatic mission in Taipei. (Both Washington and Canberra eventually set the scene for the restoration of full diplomatic relations with the Communist regime on mainland China in the 1970s.)

Or take the Suez crisis of 1956. President Eisenhower and Dulles, his secretary of state, opposed military action against Egypt. However, Menzies sided with the British, French, and Israelis against Nasser. (Menzies told the British prime minister Anthony Eden at the height of the crisis: “You must never entertain any doubts about the British quality of this country.”)

Or take the Indonesian annexation of Dutch New Guinea (or West Papua) in 1962. President John F. Kennedy, a passionate advocate for western values, placated the anti-western Soekarno. However, Menzies and the Labor opposition, led by Arthur Calwell, initially opposed Jakarta’s aggression.

The third myth that is starting to cloud much commentary of the alliance is this: that Australia is facing a choice between its close security alliance with America and its rapidly developing trade relationship with China.

It is true that, for Washington, the rise of China means the emergence of a potential strategic rival. For Canberra, it is the opportunity for a rewarding commercial relationship.

But this should not suggest that Australia is faced with a hard, stark choice between the US and China — not, at least, one of them insists such a choice be made.

But it does suggest that Australia will need to play a more demanding diplomatic game than ever before, one that will sometimes involve the difficult feat of riding two horses simultaneously.

As my colleague Owen Harries and I have argued elsewhere, this means that instead of embracing the virtues of dependability and unconditional loyalty that have served Australians well since Federation in 1901, we will need to acquire and cultivate a range of new skills: ambiguity, discrimination, agility, qualified commitment.

Such skills, of course, are among the basic components of the foreign policy realist toolkit.

But the special conditions that have for much of our existence allowed Australia to dispense with their regular use are ending. Thus, Canberra will need to regard the U.S. alliance not as an unqualified endorsement à la Julia Gillard or as part of some kind of Anglosphere à la Mark Steyn, but as a pragmatic device to be adjusted to changing conditions to secure the Australian national interest.

Again, as Harries and I have argued: 

Yes, Australia will stay on the U.S. bandwagon, but instead of always leading the cheer squad it will need to cultivate some of the skills of the helpful passenger. These include encouraging careful steering, some timely map reading, a judicious use of the brakes and, not least, better road manners. As with all efforts at back-seat driving, it is unlikely that such advice will be gratefully received. But it would serve the best interests of both countries.

29 August 2011