In recent decades, every financial crisis that has had cross-border dimensions or implications has brought forth widespread calls reform of the international financial system. Such calls have often featured suggestions that it is time for a new Bretton Woods, referring to the United Statesled conference in New Hampshire in July 1944 that gave rise to the post-war monetary system and its institutions. Less grandiose, but with similar intent have been calls for changes to the international financial architecture.
The global crisis that first became visible in August 2007 has proved to be no exception to this trend. Indeed, both France’s President Nicolas Sarkozy and Britain’s Prime Minister Gordon Brown have been heard to declare that a new Bretton Woods is imminent, perhaps taking the modern form of agreements and statements made by the G20 countries, which first met at head-of-government level in Washington in November 2008 and then in London in April 2009.
The G20 is a symbol of change, since this wider body, taking in China, India and Brazil as well as many smaller middle-income and developing countries, is intended to gradually supersede the old G7 structure which since the 1970s has convened the richest countries of the world as a sort of global steering committee. The G7 (now G8, with Russia) lives on but looks increasingly anachronistic. Even so, nothing that truly compares to the 1944 agreement has come even close to emerging either from the G20 or the old G8.
This talk of Bretton Woods or of new architecture, whatever that really means, appears to arise more from the desire of political leaders and their speech writers to sound important. Nevertheless, there are reasons to believe that the global crisis could prove different from its predecessors in the 1980s and 1990s and may eventually lead to substantial changes in the international financial system. The contention of this article is that this will occur not in a “big bang” as at Bretton Woods nor as the result of a new architectural blueprint but rather
in a gradual yet inexorable process, over five to 10 years.
For a start, while previous crises—including the Third World debt crisis of the 1980s, the Mexican peso crisis of 1995, and the East Asian financial crisis of 1997-98—have had some cross-border characteristics and implications, the current financial collapse and sharp economic contraction have been truly global, taking in rich countries and poorer ones alike. This is producing a strong sense that if the problem is shared, so too should be the solution.
Secondly, the financial origins of this collapse can be connected directly with the freedom of capital to flow internationally, which came about thanks to the dismantling of exchange controls in the 1980s and ’90s, and with failings in efforts during the 1990s and the present decade to establish global standards in banking regulation and supervision. Thirdly, the boom that preceded this bust was associated with growing macroeconomic imbalances between surplus and deficit countries of precisely the sort that the Bretton Woods conference of 1944 set out to control. At last, this historical parallel may have some relevance. Connected with this, and finally, the boom and now the bust have also become associated with a longer-term shift in the balance of economic power around the world, as China and other big developing countries increase their weight in trade, in capital flows and in flows of official funds.
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