When Barack Obama was talking to about 200,000 Berliners during the United States presidential campaign in 2008, he said “that the problems of the world were too great to be solved by one nation alone”. Well, most of us always knew that. But Obama was recognising more than the United States’ need for the European alliance. He was acknowledging the profound, irreversible redistribution of power in the world that actually has far more to do with China and India than with the Europeans. History suggests a precedent for adapting diplomatic practice to such changes—a precedent to which Obama appears intuitively oriented.
The increased status of the G20 is a logical consequence of the interaction of those forces of change. It used to be just a talk-fest for the treasurers of the top 20 economies, but it now requires heads of government. The six great powers (the United States, China, India, Russia, the European Union and Japan), the eight major emerging powers (Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, Indonesia, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, South Korea and South Africa) and six long-established and usually prosperous Western powers (Germany, Britain, France, Italy, Canada and Spain) plus Australia make up a forum which will have an impact on future decisions about how to managethe crises of our multipolar and rapidly changing world. No other grouping takes most of the policy-makers concerned into so influential a company.
George Bush did not invite all the “possibles” to the November 2008 meeting. Later three or more other powers ought to qualify for the group (Iran, Pakistan and Vietnam), and it might in time become the G25. So, to define the overall power-distribution that appears to be emerging this century, it is a central group of the six great powers, a larger circle of at least 18 or so majorpowers, and an outer contingent of the remaining 175 or so other governments of the society of states. But even minor and middle powers in that third group have much more capacity than they have had in earlier centuries to upset the global apple-cart. The world saw that in the economic crisis of late 2008. Though Iceland has a smaller population than Canberra, and no armed forces,its bankers nevertheless seem to have managed (inadvertently) not only to have destroyed their own government but also to have damaged the finances of Britain. That made them, to my mind, surprisingly powerful non-state actors, along with their confrères on Wall Street.
During the second half of the 20th century, the international distribution of power, in contrast to the fast-changing present, was rather stable. Washington and Moscow, for the 43 years of the Cold War (1946–89) glowered at each other, across what often seemed an unbridgeable chasm. Then the Soviet Union fell apart, and we had the 10 years of the “unipolar moment”, of unchallenged US paramountcy. Now that moment has also passed into history. So it has become possible to ask ourselves what this new distribution of power (the context Obama must act in) means for the prospect of maintaining a reasonable degree of order, prosperity and democracy in the world—a very dangerous and crisis-ridden multipolar world, a world of a great many “unknown unknowns”.
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