It is by now a cliché to observe that Barack Obama took office facing the greatest challenge of any United States president since Franklin Roosevelt. The US economy had been in free-fall since the northern summer of 2008, the nation’s image around the world had taken a beating over the previous eight years. Obama inherited a losing war in Iraq, a deteriorating situation in Afghanistan and a wide array of unresolved foreign policy problems. No president in living memory had taken office with so much to solve and such limited room to manoeuvre.
The new president wasted little time in responding. In his first 100 days, Obama pushed through an ambitious economic recovery program that included a major fiscal stimulus package, a controversial plan to buy up toxic assets in the banking industry, a limited bail-out for automobile manufacturers and proposals for a new regulatory regime for Wall Street. At the same time, he launched a dizzying set of foreign policy initiatives. After six months, Obama almost seemed to be the miracle worker his campaign had promised. As former advisor to President Clinton, William Galston, commented after Obama’s first 100 days: “If he’s right, our traditional notion of the limits of the possible—the idea that Washington can only handle so much at one time—will be blown to smithereens.”
Yet appearances can be deceiving, and this is almost certainly the case when it comes to foreign policy. Although Obama has made a number of positive moves, his actions to date are more style than substance. To be blunt, anyone who expects Obama to produce a dramatic transformation in America’s global position is going to be disappointed.
There are three reasons why major foreign policy achievements are unlikely. First, the big issue is still the economy, and Obama is going to focus most of his time and political capital there. Success in this area is critical to the rest of his agenda and to his prospects for re-election in 2012. Second, Obama is a pragmatic centrist and his foreign policy team is made up of mainstream liberal internationalists who believe active US leadership is essential to solving most international problems. Although they will undoubtedly try to reverse the excesses of the Bush administration, this group is unlikely to undertake a fundamental rethinking of the US’s global role. Third, and most important, there are no easy problems on Obama’s foreign policy “to-do” list. Even if he was able to devote his full attention to these issues, it would be difficult to resolve any of them quickly.
In terms of grand strategy, his ultimate aim must be to bring US commitments back into alignment with its interests and resources—to restore what Walter Lippmann termed “solvency” to US foreign policy. This broad goal can be achieved by extricating the nation from some current obligations, by improving relations with adversaries, by getting other states to bear a greater share of America’s burden, or a combination of all three. Obama will try to keep US commitments within bounds and to improve relations with several adversaries, while taking symbolic steps to repair the damage the Bush administration did to the country’s global reputation. But he is unlikely to achieve any far-reaching breakthroughs. The foreign policy agenda at the end of his first term is likely to look a lot like it does today. To see why, let us look more closely at the crises he faces.
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